![]() Halder assumed that the war against the Soviet Union was essentially won in the summer of 1941. The Germans believed that it would take the Americans until 1945 to mobilize if they entered the war in 1940-41. In Halder's view, the latter had no appreciation of the logistical difficulties in Africa and was pulling resources from more important theatres. He believed he could force Britain to the negotiating table by destroying the Soviet Union. The rationale for invading the Soviet Union is repeated in 4-5 different entries, and came directly from Hitler. Eventually Hitler and the high command stopped believing in these numbers. The Germans thought they were winning the Battle of Britain because the Luftwaffe exaggerated the number of British planes they destroyed. There are several entries about the Heer's planning for Sealion, followed by a realization that the information provided to the General Staff by the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe was faulty and essentially useless. Halder assumed that the war was essentially won around the time France fell. He believed that the Wehrmacht should close in, even though many of the units were attrited from previous battles. Halder opposed giving the Luftwaffe the task of destroying the pocket at Dunkirk. ![]() ![]() If you want to understand why things unfolded as they did, however, this is valuable source. Were many of those decisions poor, with hindsight? Yes. Halder was no genius, but reading this, you are able to grasp how decisions were made by reasonably intelligent people, based on the information that was available to them at the time. More than any other book I've read, this diary provides insight into how Germany lost the war.
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